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Abstract 
 
Like many sports in adolescence, junior hockey is organized by age groups. Typically, 
players born after December 31st are placed in the subsequent age cohort and as a result, 
will have an age advantage over those players born closer to the end of the year. While this 
relative age effect (RAE) has been well-established in junior hockey and other professional 
sports, the long-term impact of this phenomenon is not well understood. Using roster data 
on North American National Hockey League (NHL) players from the 2008-2009 season to the 
2015-2016 season, we document a RAE reversal—players born in the last quarter of the 
year (October-December) score more and command higher salaries than those born in the 
first quarter of the year. This reversal is even more pronounced among the NHL “elite.” We 
find that among players in the 90th percentile of scoring, those born in the last quarter of 
the year score about 9 more points per season than those born in the first quarter. Likewise, 
elite players in the 90th percentile of salary who are born in the last quarter of the year earn 
51% more pay than players born at the start of the year. Surprisingly, compared to players 
at the lower end of the performance distribution, the RAE reversal is about three to four 
times greater among elite players.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Evidence of a Relative Age Effect (RAE) has attracted interest beyond academia due 
to the fact that seemingly benign policies—such as age cut-offs—may shape later life 
success [1]. While this phenomenon can be found in multiple studies of hockey [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6], most evidence relies on simple metrics to gauge success, such as assessing if there is a 
disproportionate percentage of hockey players (junior and professional) on a team roster 
that were born in the first quarter of the year.  
Surprisingly, few studies have examined the RAE on player productivity in the 
National Hockey League (NHL) [7, 8]. In these studies, there is evidence of a RAE reversal. 
Although players born at the end of the year are less likely to make the NHL, of those who 
do, they played more games, scored more points, and earned higher salaries [7, 8]. We 
argue that although the RAE appears to initially favor relatively older players in the minor 
leagues, if relatively younger players make the NHL, they will likely outperform their peers 
across a number of outcomes. Thus, being an “underdog” in the minor leagues may lead to 
improved performance in the NHL.  
To date, studies have explored the RAE by averaging the performance of all players. 
This is reasonable when the data are normally distributed. However, since players born at 
the end of the year might be disproportiantely placed in the left tail of the ability 
distribution [2, 3], this approach could underestimate the RAE when elite players are 
averaged with all other players. To address this possibility, we use a quantile regression to 
test for the presence of the RAE along the distribution of two measures of performance of 
North American players: total yearly points scored and annual salaries. As noted in previous 
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literature, we expect to find a RAE reversal for both measures. Because of the possible 
skewed ability  distribution, we expect the RAE reversal to be stronger among what we will 
call the NHL “elite”—players with exceptional talent (as measured by players in the top 
quantiles of the salary and point distributions) [2].  
We also investigate the RAE on the quarter-of-birth distribution on the entire 
population of North American players. Based on previous literature, we expect players born 
in the first two quarters to be over-represented, compared to players born later in the year. 
Moreover, unlike previous studies, we investigate the presence of the RAE on quarter-of-
birth distributions by draft age, which is established by NHL drafting rules. In the text, we 
speculate how these rules may affect the RAE reversal in points and salaries. 
 
Literature Review 
Previous results 
There is substantial evidence for the RAE in a number of different contexts, as 
people born shortly after imposed age cut-offs are placed in the subsequent age cohort. As 
a result, these players can have an age advantage over players born closer to the end of the 
cut-off. Relative age differences have been found to impact child outcomes such as 
education [9, 10], self-esteem [11] and physical strength [12]. The RAE can occur for 
numerous reasons, but in sports, because of the size and maturity advantage for children 
born right after age cut-offs, relatively older children likely receive more exposure to better 
competition which contributes to more time for deliberate practice and the development of 
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abilities [5, 6, 14, 15, 16]. In this sense, maturity is mistaken for talent, and those with 
greater physical maturity are provided more opportunity to train and develop.   
Interestingly, when examining the impact of the RAE in sports across a number of 
sports and countries, results vary. For example, research on German soccer players found 
that players born shortly after the age cut-off were more likely to play professional soccer 
[17]. A RAE was also documented for European professional soccer players [18], male and 
female international basketball players [19], and male and female college volleyball players 
in Canada [20]. In contrast, the RAE in female sports suggests a more varied pattern than 
male sports [21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. For example, for females competing in gymnastics and 
rugby, the RAE appears to be advantageous at younger ages and then have little or no effect 
in later ages [21, 23]—likely because RAE is sport-specific by gender [24]. 
Research on the RAE in sports has perhaps been most thoroughly examined among 
hockey players. Three decades ago, research on players in the NHL and junior hockey (the 
league that feeds most players to the NHL) found a strong relationship between league 
participation and birth month [13]. For even younger players (minor hockey), Canadian 
children born in the first half of the year were more likely to play minor hockey and more 
likely to play for top teams [6]. More recent research continues to show a strong 
relationship between birth month and the proportion of players in junior hockey in Canada 
[3] and the likelihood of being chosen in the NHL draft [2, 5]. Yet, there is growing evidence 
that the RAE may actually reverse as players advance in professional sports [7, 8]. A reversal 
has been found in soccer, rugby, handball, cricket, and hockey where relatively younger 
players appear to suffer disadvantage earlier on, but overcome this disadvantage to earn 
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more money [7, 17], enjoy longer careers [2, 7], score more points [8] and appear on the 
most elite rosters and squads [2, 26].  
 
Explanations for the RAE Reversal 
We highlight two compelling explanations in the literature to understand why a RAE 
reversal might occur. The first is psychological. Smaller players in junior hockey who 
subsequently make it to the NHL demonstrate higher than average resilience due to their 
ability to overcome size limitations [17, 27, 28]. To compete against their relatively older 
and bigger peers, these players learn to work harder [29], resulting in positive peer effects 
that spark resilience and improve motivation. This initial disadvantage will eventually work 
in their favor when early differences in size reach parity in young adulthood. The 
psychological benefit in the NHL is that these “underdogs” are better equipped to overcome 
subsequent obstacles and succeed in professional play [28]. Thus, this early disadvantage (if 
they can overcome it) becomes a later advantage in professional play—an underdog effect.  
 The second explanation suggests that the players born later in the year (relatively 
younger) who then become successful athletes may not only have a degree of resilience, but 
also superior ability—a biological explanation. For these younger, smaller players to 
overcome, “a system that discriminates against them” (372) [17], they need more than grit 
and determination, they must also be more talented than their relatively larger 
counterparts to counteract their size disadvantage [17]. It follows that these younger 
players are likely positively selected (i.e. selected from the right tail of the ability 
distribution). Therefore, while maturity and size can delay or postpone the screening of 
talented players into the NHL, talent will ultimately win out when assessing performance 
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outcomes. In the NHL, the proportion of relatively young players with superior ability is 
potentially larger than that of relatively older players because more of the relatively older 
player’s success has been artificially enhanced by the RAE.  
We should note that although these two explanations (effort plus talent) might 
provide persuasive explanations for a RAE reversal among the NHL elite, there might be a 
less obvious factor influencing the reversal—the NHL draft age cut-offs. The NHL restricts 
entry into the draft for players who turn 18 years-old by September 15th, but who are not 
older than 20 years-old before December 31st. This means that all 18-year-olds who are 
drafted in the NHL are born in the first three quarters of the year. Those born in the last 
quarter of the year must wait another year to enter the draft. Ironically, this means that the 
same factors that initially benefitted those born in the beginning of the year may reverse 
their advantage by making them the youngest on their NHL team. For those waiting a year 
for the NHL eligibility, they will be relatively older than their rookie counterparts. If being 
slightly older at the start of the NHL career is any advantage, then the initial benefactors of 
the RAE in junior hockey are now at a disadvantage, simply by another cut-off effect.  
Given evidence of the RAE reversal in the literature and compelling explanations for 
the reversal, we have a simple expectation—the reversal will be greatest among the highest 
scoring and highest paid athletes in the NHL.  
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Data and Methods 
Sample 
To examine quarter-of-birth distributions and performance outcomes, we compiled 
data of nearly all NHL players over 8 consecutive NHL seasons; player data across several 
years were collected from the 2008-2009 season through the 2015-2016 season. This 
provided a total of 8,760 player-season observations (i.e. 2,017 individual players). Data 
were collected from two sources, www.nhl.com and www.capfriendly.com. A total of 20 
student researchers entered data and a subset of students reviewed the accuracy of the 
data entered.     
We did not use all the player-season observations, but focus on drafted American 
and Canadian players who were not goalies, and played in a given season. Undrafted players 
were excluded because draft related information do not exist (e.g. draft year and draft age), 
which would prevent comparability across models. Likewise, we excluded goalies from the 
analyses because goalies’ performance outcomes are not comparable to other positions. For 
a similar reason, observations on players who belong to an NHL team but in a given season 
played abroad or in minor leagues are excluded because there was no comparable data 
available when these players are not in the NHL. Finally, the analyses are restricted to North 
American players because we do not have information on when non-North American 
players started to play professionally. This totaled 4,447 player-season observations.  
We analyzed this selected population with both descriptive statistics and quantile 
regression analyses [30]. As descriptive statistics can reveal basic patterns in the data, 
quantile regression can reveal if the RAE varies across the distribution of points and salary, 
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while also accounting for outliers and other statistical issues [31, 32, 33]. We should note 
that analyses are of all known players in quarter-of-birth-date distribution and does not 
necessarily require the use of statistical inference, although results with statistical 
significance scores are still provided in final models (see [38]). 
 
Analyses of Birth dates distributions and NHL drafting rules 
To analyze the quarter of birth date distribution, we assess different sub-populations 
based on age at draft combined with information from the NHL drafting system. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study to conduct analyses on the RAE on the birth date 
distribution while accounting for this rule. The NHL’s draft rules establish that only players 
within a certain age-range in the draft year are eligible for the NHL draft: those who turn 18 
years-old by September 15th up until those who turn 20 years-old by December 31st in the 
draft year. The NHL drafting rules limit relatively younger player’s eligibility period (2 years) 
compared to relatively older peers (3 years).  
 
Quantile regression 
Quantile regression is an ideal econometric approach to investigate the change of 
the RAE along the points and salary distributions, yet, only one study has used this 
technique before within a similar context (on Italian soccer players’ salaries, see [16]). 
Compared to ordinary least squares (OLS), this method is not limited by the assumption that 
the RAE is the same at the lower/upper tail of the distribution as at the mean. The quantile 
regression describes the relationship between measures in the model across quantiles of 
the outcome variable [33] and is appropriate for studies of outcome variables characterized 
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by extremely positively skewed distributions. This is particularly true for the case when 
scholars investigate the distribution of athletes’ salaries because of the presence of 
superstars [26, 27]. Usually, scholars implement a logarithmic transformation of salaries, 
which we implement as well. However, although the resulting distribution is less skewed, it 
may still not be sufficiently normal. As a result, OLS might still provide under- or over-
estimates.  
Quantile regression is also preferred over the utilization of the OLS when this 
method is used to examine isolated arbitrary sub-samples, based on different outcome 
levels. When analyzed this way, the investigation of just sub-samples reduces efficiency, 
since the estimates are obtained from smaller samples. Also, the investigation of sub-
samples causes sample selection bias, which occurs with the arbitrary segmentation of the 
sample into sub-samples [33]. 
Additionally, the quantile regression could be used as a robustness check to compare 
the estimates obtained at the conditional median of the outcome variable, that is, the 50th 
percentile of the distribution, to the estimates obtained at the conditional mean of the 
outcome variable with the OLS. Thus, while in this study we focus on the quantile 
regression, we also discuss how these results would change if we used the OLS .  
For these quantile regression analyses, we use the Stata 14 command qreg2 [34] and 
focus on the usual 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the distribution [16]. This 
command allows us to compute standard errors clustered on players. Clustered standard 
errors account for the possibility that the variance of the error term varies by player (i.e. 
heteroscedasticity), but that it is similar within each player (i.e. in this case a cluster equals 
an individual player observed over multiple seasons); we use this adjustment because there 
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are repeated observations for individual players that are not likely to be independent. The 
methodology to compute clustered standard errors for quantile regressions is illustrated in 
previous research [33]. 
We conduct robustness checks with four alternative model specifications. First, we 
conducted analyses on points and salaries with the OLS at the conditional mean. In this 
model specification, first we insert the quarter of birth dummies and afterwards the other 
control variables. Second, again with the OLS, we repeat analyses on only Canadian players, 
and, only for this sub-population, add a dummy variable for players having played in the 
Canadian Junior Hockey League. In this way, the regression analysis of Canadians works as a 
an additional robustness check: Canadian and American players trained under the same cut-
off (December 31st) (except for players who grew up in Minnesota—August 31st): the 
restriction to Canadian players insures the same cut-off date applies to everyone. Third, we 
repeat the analyses using experience and its standardized square in place of age, as well as 
season dummies. Fourth, we repeat these analyses on players who were drafted at 19 and 
20 years of age. 
The Stata syntax for figures and tables in this paper (as well as results reported in the 
S1 Appendix) are available in the online material. The syntax also includes additional 
analyses for robustness checks mentioned in this paper, but not reported here. 
 
Outcome measures 
The outcome measures are annual points (i.e. goals plus assists) and annual salary. In 
accordance with existing literature, we transform salary data into the natural logarithm. 
Thus, the RAE estimates on salaries represent salary gaps in percentage terms, with respect 
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to the reference quarter (i.e. January-March). They were computed as [exp(?̂?)-1]*100. Also, 
salaries are deflated at 2015 Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and 
account for slide contracts, buyouts, and bonuses. 
 
Explanatory measures 
The key measure of interest is birth quarter. We created dummy variables for 
quarters of birth, with the aim of capturing possible nonlinear effects [35]. The reference 
category is the first quarter (January-March). When we analyze birth distribution by quarter, 
we account for player’s age when the draft occurred. In quantile regressions, we 
additionally control for the player’s current age, body mass index (weight/(height^2) (see 
[37]), player position, season unobservable characteristics, team, country, and draft year. 
We also account for the standardized square of age ((observed squared age – average 
squared age)/standard deviation of age; this transformation breaks the collinearity that 
squared age would have with age). 
We should note that over the considered period, mean and median salaries 
increased monotonically; however, the lack of control for this increase in real salaries does 
not affect our analyses because this monotonic increase is already captured while 
controlling for season-specific unobservable characteristics. We should also note that draft 
age (similar to age at school entry for studies on the RAE in education) is affected by players’ 
relative age, as suggested in past research [36, 39, 40]. This inclusion as a control variable 
improves our interpretation of the RAE estimates, as has been adopted in studies on salary 
discrimination based on ethnicity where performance measures have been analyzed (for a 
literature review see [41]).  
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Results and Discussion 
Birth date distribution 
In this section we analyze the birth date distribution. Fig 1 reports the frequencies of 
quarter of births for drafted North-American NHL non-goalies (N=4,447), where January-
March is quarter is coded as 0 and so on. October-December is coded as 3. We also 
investigate the frequency of quarter of birth based on age at draft at 18 (N=2,363), 19 
(N=1,538) and 20 (N=546), see Fig 2. 
 
Fig 1. Quarter of birth rate distribution. 
 
Fig 2. Quarter of birth distributions, based on age at draft. 
 
 We also illustrate the distributions of quarter of birth for two additional types of 
players: i) players who play in NHL, but who were not drafted (N=935)—they entered NHL as 
free-agents; ii) observations on players who entered NHL (either as draftees or as free-
agents), but play abroad or in minor leagues (N=819). These results are illustrated in S1 
Appendix.  
Descriptive statistics of the data are presented below. We use pairwise correlation to 
show the relationship between measures. We also report mean and standard deviation 
statistics (see Table 1).  
   Table 1 Pairwise correlations and descriptive statistics. 
Pairwise correlation 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Points  1 
    
 
2. Ln(salary)  0.558 1
   
 
3. Age at draft -0.071 -0.062 1
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4. Age 0.069 0.309 0.213 1   
5. BMI  0.012 0.071 -0.007 0.149 1  
6. Quarter (C) 0.096 0.076 0.466 0.129 0.021 1 
       
Descriptive statistics 
     
 
N 4,447 4,447 4,447 4,447 4,447 1,447 
Mean 19.406 14 0.591 8.332 0.038 1.316 
Standard dev. 19.605 1.172 0.698 4.492 0.002 1.101 
Min 0 8.059 0 0 0.030 0 
Max 109 17.639 2 29 0.053 3 
Note: Correlations in bold: p<0.1. The minimum value of age at draft has been subtracted 
(e.g., 0 = 18 years of age, 2 = 20 years of age); the minimum value of age has been 
subtracted (e.g., 0 = 18 years of age, 29 = 47 years of age). (C) stands for “categorical” 
version of the quarter of birth variable. 
 
Additional descriptive statistics by quarter of birth are provided in Tables 2 and 3. In 
Table 2, we report the points scored by players in the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of 
the player-season’s point distribution (upper panel). We do this by quarter and overall. In 
Table 3 we report equivalent statistics but for salaries. 
 
Table 2 Points, by quarter and overall at the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, 90
th
  percentile. 
 Quarter Overall 
 Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep Oct-Dec  
Percentile      
25
th
  3 3 4 4 3 
50
th
  11 13 15 15 13 
75
th
 25 31 34 34 30 
90
th
  54 60 64 60 49 
      
Descr. stat. 
    
 
N 1,334 1,254 980 879 4,447 
Mean 16.681 19.161 21.773 21.255 19.406 
Standard dev. 17.747 19.634 21.266 19.813 19.605 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 97 98 109 106 109 
Note: “Overall” pulls together observations on players born in different 
quarters. 
  
  
Table 3 Ln_Salaries, by quarter and overall at the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, 90
th
  
percentile. 
 Quarter Overall 
 Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep Oct-Dec  
Percentile      
 13 
25
th
  13.411 13.385 13.404 13.459 13.404 
50
th
  13.737 13.758 13.81 13.847 13.763 
75
th
 14.68 14.914 15.014 15.068 14.923 
90
th
  15.548 15.719 15.761 15.703 15.425 
      
Descr. stat. 
    
 
N 1,334 1,254 980 879 4,447 
Mean 13.873 13.999 14.072 14.112 14 
Standard dev. 1.179 1.165 1.181 1.143 1.172 
Min 8.09 8.059 8.102 8.102 8.059 
Max 16.474 17.639 16.486 16.811 17.639 
Note: “Overall” pulls together observations on players born in different 
quarters. 
 
Fig 3 and Fig 4 provide a visual distribution of scores and salary by birth quarter.  
 
Fig 3. Points distribution, by quarter of birth. 
 
Fig 4. Salaries distribution, by quarter of birth. 
 
Points 
In this section we investigate the RAE on points using quantile regression (as a point 
of reference, see S1 Appendix for OLS results). We focus on the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles of the points distribution of North American players. The results are reported in 
Table 4. Analyses with the conditional mean and only for Canadian players using OLS is 
reported in the Appendix (see S1 Table 1). 
 
Table 4. The RAE by quarter, on points; quantile regression at the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, 90
th
  
percentile. 
 North Am. North Am. North Am. North Am. 
Variables Points Points Points Points  
 25% 50% 75% 90% 
     
April-June 0.116 0.452 3.135 0.956 
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 (0.540) (1.443) (2.723) (2.737) 
July-September 1.122 4.869** 7.981*** 6.333** 
 (0.727) (2.035) (2.647) (2.786) 
October-December 1.819** 6.546*** 11.46*** 9.222*** 
 (0.854) (1.987) (3.072) (2.885) 
     
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Can. Jr. Hockey N N N N 
     
Observations 4,447 4,447 4,447 4,447 
Pseudo R-squared 0.058 0.120 0.132 0.114 
Note: Only North American players are investigated. In this investigation, repeated 
observations per player are used. All the control variables are included; no analysis on the sub-
sample of only Canadians is carried out. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on 
players. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In this investigation, repeated observations per player 
are used.  
We conducted additional analyses not reported for brevity, but available upon 
request. First, we control for experience, its standardized square in place of age, and season 
dummies; the results are equivalent to those in Table 4. Second, we restricted the analyses 
on players who were drafted at 19 and 20 years of age; these results point in the same 
direction of those in Table 4, and are even stronger because the best players who were 
drafted at 18 years of age are excluded. 
Salaries 
In this section we investigate the RAE on salaries. As with points, we implement the 
analyses at the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the salary distribution of North 
American players.  
 
Table 5. The RAE by quarter, on natural logarithm of salaries; quantile regression. 
 North Am. North Am. North Am. North Am. 
Variables Ln_Salary Ln_Salary Ln_Salary Ln_Salary 
 25% 50% 75% 90% 
     
April-June -0.019 0.042 0.041 0.064 
 (0.043) (0.060) (0.091) (0.083) 
July-September 0.064 0.194** 0.217** 0.166* 
 (0.050) (0.077) (0.093) (0.086) 
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October-December 0.149** 0.289*** 0.392*** 0.414*** 
 (0.066) (0.083) (0.112) (0.110)  
     
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Can. Jr. Hockey N N N N 
     
Observations 4,447 4,447 4,447 4,447 
Pseudo R-squared 0.125 0.172 0.158 0.128 
Note: Only North American players are investigated. In this investigation, repeated 
observations per player are used. All the control variables are included; no analysis on the sub-
sample of only Canadians is carried out. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on 
players. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
As before, OLS analyses of ln(salary) , including that with the restricted sample on 
Canadian players alone, can be found in the Appendix (see S1 Table 2). Results controlling 
for experience, its standardized square in place of age, and season dummies, as well as 
analyses on players drafted at 19 and 20 years of age are not reported for sake of brevity 
(available upon request). The results from these additional analyses confirm those in Table 
5. 
Discussion 
With the available literature as our guide, we had hypothesized that the reversal will 
be greatest among the highest scoring and highest paid athletes in the NHL. We find that 
Figure 1 provides prima facie evidence that players born in the third and fourth quarter are 
under-represented, since they should represent approximately 25% of the distribution each. 
Figure 2 shows the quarter-of-birth distribution by age at draft. As per the rule, this figure 
shows that no player born in the fourth quarter is drafted at 18; in contrast, at 19 and 20 
years of age about 45% and 38% of the players respectively are born in the fourth quarter. 
While NHL teams prefer to draft 18-year old players, players born in the fourth quarter of 
their 18th year cannot be drafted. Therefore, although we observe a RAE reversal on the 
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distributions of quarter of birth for players drafted at 19 and 20, there is no reversal possible 
in the overall distribution of quarters of birth. On one hand, this result is important because 
it shows a mechanic inflation of the under-representation of relatively young players. On the 
other hand, this result might provide an additional explanation for the RAE reversal in terms 
of performance; more details are discussed in the next section. 
We should note that, as S1 Fig 1 suggests, being selected as a free-agent (and thus 
enter later into NHL) does not contribute to the overall under-representation of relatively 
young players. In fact, this figure shows an approximately uniform distribution of quarters of 
birth for free-agents.  
Finally, in line with expectations, we observe an over-representation of players born 
in the first two quarters among non-NHL players (e.g. players that belong to NHL teams but 
in that season are loaned to minor leagues or teams abroad) (see in S1 Fig 2). This figure 
suggests that relatively older players who could enter the NHL when they were 18 years-old 
are more frequently considered too immature to play in the NHL and are sent to minor 
leagues to cumulate experience. This analysis was also only conducted on non-NHL players 
who were drafted—a slightly smaller sub-sample; this result is not reported for sake of 
brevity (available upon request). 
Table 1 shows that quarter of birth is positively and statistically significantly 
correlated to both points and salaries; this is confirmed in Tables 2 and 3. For points, the 
first-quarter player in the 90th percentile scored 54 points in a given season, while the player 
born at the end of the year scored about 60 points (see Table 2). Likewise, Table 3 on the 
natural log of salaries for selected players along the distribution suggests a RAE reversal. 
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Figures 3 and 4, on the distribution of salaries and points respectively, by quarter of birth, 
provide a graphic illustration of the RAE reversal.  
Table 4 provides evidence of the RAE reversal that is greatest among NHL elites in 
terms of points. We see that in no percentile do the players born later in the year score less 
than their older peers born earlier in the year. The RAE reversal increases in the quantile of 
the points distribution: the positive points gap in favor of athletes born later in the year is 
small, being 1.8; then it increases at the median by almost four times, and at 75% and 90% 
of the points distribution, relatively young players score 11.4 and 9.2 more points than their 
relatively older counterparts. Also, athletes born in the third quarter enjoy a positive points 
gap, which ranges between about 5 and 8 additional points and appears only from the 
median of the points distribution.  
Also, we find strong evidence of the RAE in terms of salaries (see Table 5). In none of 
the percentiles do the players born later in the year earn less than their older peers born 
earlier in the year. Moreover, we observe that the RAE reversal is driven by salary disparities 
in the top quantiles. The positive salary gap in favor of athletes born later in the year is small 
(16%) then increases at the median salary, where players born in the fourth quarter earn 
33.5% more than players born in the first quarter. At 75% and 90% of the salary distribution, 
relatively young players earn about 48-51.3% more than relatively older counterparts. Also 
athletes born in the third quarter enjoy a positive salary gap, but it is smaller and does not 
seem to increase by quantile in a consistent way. 
Results replicated with the OLS (see S1 Appendix) at the conditional mean of the 
outcome variable tend to be quite larger than those at the median of the outcome variable 
with the quantile regression. Therefore, as expected, results are less sensitive to variations 
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in point and salary gaps across the distribution.  Results from additional robustness checks 
provide results in the same directions. 
Three Elite Players 
To illustrate our findings, we compare our results with three NHL “elite” players born 
in different quarters of the year. The following players, Steven Stamkos, Sydney Crosby, and 
Patrick Kane, are the highest scoring North American players in the NHL and have the 
highest points per game average for all North American players over the period we cover in 
our data (since the 2008-2009 season).  Steven Stamkos was born in the first birth quarter 
(February) and has averaged 65 points per season over his career, which is 15 points higher 
than the points scored by players in the 90th percentile of the overall distribution. Sydney 
Crosby, born in the third birth quarter (August), has averaged 85.5 points per year, which is 
about 46 points higher than the 90th percentile. Finally, Patrick Kane, born in the fourth birth 
quarter (November), has averaged 75 points per year throughout his career, which is about 
36 points higher than the 90th percentile.  
Their career average salaries reflect their exceptional productivity above the 90th 
percentile of the overall distribution. Steven Stamkos, again born in the first quarter, has an 
average salary of $5,912,500 per season (a 15.59 on the natural logarithmic scale). Sidney 
Crosby, born in the third birth quarter, has an average salary of $9,286,364 (a 16.04 on the 
natural logarithmic scale). Patrick Kane, born in the last birth quarter, has an annual salary 
of $6,865,909 per year (a 15.74 on the natural logarithmic scale).  We see that they are all 
exceptionally compensated for their productivity at levels much higher than even the top 10 
percent of the overall distribution, even as the patterns still reflect a RAE reversal. Although 
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not always true for each individual case, from these comparisons we are able to illustrate 
what our findings show—a RAE reversal that is more pronounced among the NHL elite. 
 
Limitations 
This investigation presents at least two limitations. First, our study is based on data 
from only two countries: US and Canada. This limits the external validity of our results. 
Second, these countries share the same cut-off date (except for the state of Minnesota), 
which could give rise to one problem—we cannot disentangle the RAE from season-of-birth 
effects, which are shown to exist in the educational system in the US and that could also 
affect youth hockey teams in the US and elsewhere. These season-of-birth effects are 
potential confounders because they might impact the performance of players born in 
different periods of the same calendar year in unknown ways. This effect would be 
independent from maturity gaps in youth as one study suggests [42]—US winter-children 
are disproportionately born to single mothers, teenage mothers and mothers without a 
high-school degree. The impact of family structure could cause negative season-of-birth 
effects on children, at least for school achievement. Likewise, this could also impact the 
composition of future hockey players born in winter months. Thus, this type of season-of-
birth effect could bias results. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
We advance the RAE literature in two ways. First, we test for the presence of the RAE 
on points and on salaries with quantile regressions, which allow us to explore how the RAE 
varies along the distribution of points scored and salary. Second, we investigate the RAE on 
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the quarter of birth distribution by draft age (i.e., 18, 19, 20), which is established by NHL 
drafting rules; this is the first time such analysis is conducted. 
Overall, we find evidence of a RAE reversal in terms of both points and salaries. In 
each season, players born in the fourth quarter scored more points and earned more than 
players born at the beginning of the year. These gaps increased approaching the top 
quantiles of the points and salaries distributions, and these results could be explained by the 
previous literature that suggests the possible role of resilience and selection on talent. As 
initially suspected, conventional methods to analyse the RAE lead to over-estimates of the 
RAE, compared to those from quantile regression at the median value of the outcome 
variable. 
Additionally, as expected, we find that players born in the third and fourth quarter 
are under-represented. However, unlike previous studies, we show that this distribution 
changes by age at draft: no player born in the fourth quarter is drafted at 18; in contrast, at 
19 and 20 years of age at draft, about 40% of the players are born in the fourth quarter. 
Moreover, we observe that relatively older players drafted at 18 years-old are more 
frequently sent to the minor leagues. Given the combination of NHL drafting rules and the 
preference of NHL teams to draft 18-years-old players, the under-representation of 
relatively young players is mechanically inflated. However, this delayed entry of relatively 
young players into the NHL may eventually benefit them—in terms of performance. When 
they are drafted they may have accumulated more playing-time than older peers who have 
already been drafted at 18 by an NHL team, but might have played a lower amount of time 
in their first NHL season. This additional on-ice time before reaching the NHL may provide 
an edge in terms of performance (and thus wages) to fourth-quarter players during their 
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professional career. This interpretation on the positive effect of a delayed draft on 
performances is compatible with evidence from the National Football League [36]. 
In total, our findings suggest that future work should explore potential psychological 
and biological factors that may account for the RAE reversal, especially among the NHL elite. 
In this way, our results also suggest an exploration of possible mediating factors that explain 
why elites have such pronounced reversals in the RAE. To offset the inherent unfairness of 
the RAE and the later RAE reversal on performances, understanding these mediating factors 
could be used to better select talent and encourage resiliency of players. Although previous 
literature on the RAE in sports and education [36, 39, 40] suggests delaying entry into 
professional sports/school to reduce performance gaps, the reversal complicates this view 
as there are potential benefits of being the “underdog.”  Finally, from the perspective of the 
RAE in term of representativeness, our results suggest that adjustments of the drafting rules 
could reduce the disadvantages suffered by relatively young players.  
Future studies could analyse performance of players from countries with different 
cut-off dates, but who play in the same tournament (e.g. the world championship or the 
Olympic winter games). In this case, researchers would need to collect harder-to-find data 
on international players, such as age at entry into professional hockey and other factors. 
Second, future studies could examine variations of the age cut-off date within a single 
country, as it is done in soccer [43, 44]. Overall, we think the future of RAE research is 
clear—the RAE and its reversal reveal how critical something as arbitrary as age cutoffs can 
be for sport performance and suggests a complex interplay of ability, phycological and social 
contexts in understanding success in the NHL and beyond.  
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